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278 UNION LEAGUE CLUB V. JOHNSON. [18 C. (2d) 
(Ada County v. Boise CO'mmercial Club, 20 Ida. 421 [118 
Pac. 1086, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 101]), and the club admits 
that it is a "person" as defined by the act. But it insists 
that the statute applies only to those engaged in business 
for profit because the taxable activity was required to be 
"with the object of gain, benefit or advantage, either direct 
or indirect." As its purpose is not to make a profit but to 
serve its members, it argues, the judgment should be affirmed. 
It is significant that the statute does not include the word 
"profit" in its definitions but imposed a tax upon the trans-
actions of one conducting business "with the object of gain, 
benefit or advantage, either direct or indirect." Assuming 
that no profit was either intended or realized by the club from 
the operations of its dining rooms and bar, it does not follow 
that there was no "gain, benefit or advap.tage. " Few persons 
would go to a club without these facilities and they undoubt-
edly largely contribute to the success of such an enterprise. 
In construing a statute using the identical language of our 
own, the Supreme Court of Ohio aptly remarked: " 'Profit' 
may be said to be 'gain, benefit, or advantage,' but 'gain, 
benefit, or advantage' does not necessarily mean only' profit'." 
(State v. Zellner, 133 Ohio St. 263 [13 N. E. (2d) 235].) 
The respondent relies upon Cuzner v. California Club, 155 
Cal. 303 [100 Pac. 868, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1095], and Varcoe 
v. Alameda Lodge, 174 Cal. 549 [163 Pac. 909], in support of 
his position but these decisions are not determinative of the 
question. In the Cuzner case the court held that a bona fide 
social club selling liquor only to members was not subject to 
an ordinance requiring those engaged in that business to ob-
tain a license. But the ordinance did not define the word 
"business," and the court pointed out that this term "as 
used in a law imposing a license-tax on businesses, trades, pro-
fessions, and callings, ordinarily means a business in the trade 
or commercial sense, one carried on with a view to profit or 
livelihood. ' , The later decision was placed upon the same 
ground. 
As against these contentions, the respondent takes the posi-
tion that because the legislature in 1939 expressly. amended 
the statute to impose a tax upon social clubs, this court should 
construe the former law as not including them. [2] This 
statement is based upon the general rule that courts ordina-
rily assume from a new enactment, a legislative purpose to 
change the existing law. (People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116 
July, 1941.] GARVEY v. BYRAM. 279 
[255 Pac. 792,52 A. L. R. 811] ; Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 Cal. 
(2d) 746 [82 Pac. (2d) 1] .) [lb] But in view of the fact 
that at the time this amendment was made, social clubs were 
resisting the eollection of sales taxes, a legislative intent to 
clarify rather than to change the law, may well be inferred. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment 
for the appellant. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., CUrtis, J., Carter, J., and Spence, 
J., pro tern., concurred. 
Respondent '8 petition for a rehearing was denied August 
21, 1941. Traynor, J., did not participate therein. 
[L. A. No. 17800. In Bank.-July 24, 1941.] 
. RICHARD GARVEY, J r.,et aI., Petitioners, v. H. L. 
BYRAM, as Tax Collector, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Taxation-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Sale by State-Pur-
chasers-Who may Purchase-Owner.~Although Pol. Code, 
§ 3834.25, relating to the sale of property sold to the state 
for delinquent taxes, does not specifically so provide, an 
owner of property when the tax lien attached and when it 
was deeded to the state may not purchase it at the tax sale, 
even though he is the highest bidder. Any payment he may 
make is but a mode of payment of the taxes. A contrary 
rule would permit evasion of the conditions' of redemption 
specified in Pol. Code, § 3817, and, contrary to settled policy, 
enable him to secure the property free and clear of private en-
cumbrance under Pol. Code, § 3836.1. 
[2] Statutes - Oonstruction and Interpretation - Presumptions-
Legislative Intent-Omission of Reference to Settled Policy. 
When a rule is long engrained in the public policy of the state 
it must be presumed that the legislature took it for granted 
rather than sought to alter it in omitting any specific provi-
sion for its application. Thus, the failure of the legislature 
to provide in Pol. Code, § 3834.25, that bids are subject to the 
1. See 24 Oal. Jur. 358; 26 R. O. L. 412. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Taxation, § 322; 2. Statutes, § 183. 
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general rule as to the purchase by an owner of his own prop-
erty at a tax sale must be construed not as a rejection but as 
a tacit acceptance of the rule. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the execution of 
a tax deed. Writ denied. 
Richard Garvey, Jr., in pro. per., J. H. 0 'Connor, County 
Counsel, S. V. O. Prichard, Assistant County Counsel, and 
. A. Curtis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioners. 
Landels, Weigel & Crocker and Walter S. Home for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioners have' instituted this proceed-
ing in mandamus to compel the respondent, the tax collector 
of Los Angeles County, to execute a deed to petitioner Garvey 
pursuant to a public tax sale of certain real· property. Re-
spondent has generally demurred. 
Garvey was the owner of the property in question when the 
tax lien attached and when the property was deeded to the 
state for unpaid taxes. Pursuant to the procedure prescribed 
in Political Code, sections 3834.20 to 3834.25, a public sale 
was held on April 11, 1940, at which petitioner Garvey made 
the .highest bid. He bid less than the amount of the taxes 
that were delinquent when the property was deeded to the 
state,· exclusive of penalties, interest and costs, but not less 
than the minimum price specified in the resolution of the 
board of supervisors approving the sale. Respondent, H. L. 
Byram, as Tax Collector of Los Angeles County refuses to 
issue a deed to Garvey on the grounds that Political Code, 
section 3834.25 (added by Stats. of 1939, ch. 529, sec. 2), 
does not contemplate a sale to the delinquent owner of the 
. property for an amoun~ less than the accumulated unpaid 
taxes, and that it could not be so construed without violating 
article XIII, section 1 of the California Constitution requir-
ing all property in the, state to be taxed in proportion to its 
value, and article IV, section 31, prohibiti:qg the legislature 
from making or authorizing the making of any gift oI,any 
public money or thing of value to any individual. 
Political Code section 3834.25 provides: "If the property 
is not redeemed before the sale, the tax collector shall sell 
the property at public auction to the highest bidder at the 
July, 1941.] GARVEY v. BYRAM. 
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time and place fixed in the notice of intended sale; but no bid 
shall be accepted for a sum less than the minimum price 
fixed in the resolution of the board of supervisors." The sec-
tion contains no specific exclusion of bids by the former owner 
of the property. 
[1] Such an omission, however; cannot be interpreted as 
an authorization of such bids in view of the long established 
rule in this state that an owner who has held title throughout 
the period of tax delinquency cannot be a vendee at the tax 
sale. Whatever payment he makes to the tax collector in the 
course of a purported sale under such circumstances must 
be regarded as a payment of taxes and cannot serve to 
effectuate an actual sale that would convey to him title to 
the property. (Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal. 38 [85 Am. Dec. 94] ; 
McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 300; Ooppinger v. Rice, 33 Cal. 
408; Bernal v. Lynch, 36 Cal. 135; Barrett v. A.merein, 36 
Cal. 322; Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal. 216; Reily v. Lan,. 
caster, 39 Cal. 354; Ohristy v. l?isher, 58 Cal. 256; Barnard 
v. Wilson, 74 Cal. 512 [16 Pac. 307] ; Emeric v. Alvarado, 90 
Cal. 444 [27 Pac. 356] ; Gates v. Lindley, 104 Cal. 451 [38 
Pac. 311].) 
"It is well settled that one who is under a moral or legal 
obligation to pay the taxes is· not in a position to become a 
purchaser at a sale made for such taxes. If such person 
permits the property to be sold for taxes, and buys it in, 
either in person or indirectly through the agency of another, 
he does not thereby acquire any right or title to the prop-
erty, but his purchase is deemed one mode of paying the 
taxes. " (Ohristy v. Fisher, 58 Cal. 256, 258; see, also, Black 
on Tax Titles, Second Edition, sections 273-274; Blackwell on 
Tax Titles, Fourth Edition, pages 443, 444.) 
[2] When a rule is so long engrained in the public policy of 
the state it must be presumed that the legislature took it for 
granted rather than sought to alter it in omitting any specific 
provision for its application. Thus, in the present situation ' 
the failure of the legislature to provide that bids are subject 
to the rule must be construed not as a rejection but as a 
tacit acceptance of the rule. 
If a defaulting owner were allowed in effect to redeem his 
property through the simple device of SUbmitting the highest 
bid at a tax sale, he could evade the conditions of redemption 
set forth in section 3817 of the Political Code, namely, the 
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payment, before the state shall have disposed of the- prop-
erty, of "the amount of taxes, penalties for delinquency, and 
costs due thereon at the time of such sale, and also all taxes 
that were a lien upon said real property at the time said 
taxes became delinquent; and also all unpaid taxes of every 
description which are a lien against the property, for each 
year since the sale, as shown on the delinquent assessment 
rolls .... " It is significant that Political Code, section 
3817, was reenacted with minor amendments during the same 
legislative session in which Political Cod€, section 3834.25, 
was enacted and it is not plausible that the absence of a 
specific provision in the second should serve to destroy the 
effectiveness of the specific provisions in the first. 
Political Code, section 3897, originally provided that bids 
had to equal at least twice the taxes plus interest, costs, and 
expenses. (Amendments to the Codes, 1873-74, p. 153.) 
When the legislature, commencing in 1905 (Stats. and Amend. 
1905, pp. 31, 32; Stats. 1933, p. 2586; Stats. 1935,p. 1437; 
Stats. 1939, ch. 529, sec. 2), allowed lower minimum bids, it 
did not thereby enable defaulting owners to make such bids. 
Legislation that is concerned only with allowing a greater 
latitude in fixing the amount of the minimum bid cannot be 
construed to enlarge the field of bidders. 
Petitioners seek to distinguish the cases cited above on the 
ground that they prev~nt a defaulting owner, not from be-
coming a vendee at a tax sale, but only from improving his 
title thereby through the elimination of other private inter-
ests. They advance the view that if his title is subsequently 
questioned by a private encumbrancer, the court should hold 
that the purchase "is in effect only a redemption." Such a 
view, however, is at variance not only with Political Code, 
section 3817, which sets forth the conditions of red€mption, 
but with Political Code, section 3836.1, which provides that 
the tax collector's deed shall vest title in the grantee "free 
and clear of all encumbrances of any kind existing before 
the sale" except liens for future instalments of assessments, 
direct assessments, and taxes of a non-consenting tax agency. 
Faced with this clear statutory provision, petitioners maintain 
that should the defaulting owner become a grantee, principles 
of equity should prevail over the statutory provision to pre-
clude his receiving a clear title. The court would thus be 
required not only to circumscribe the rule of the cases cited, 
July, 1941.] GARVEY v. BYRAM. 
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but to run counter to express statutory provisions in order to 
formulate a policy, which finds no express legislative sanc-
tion, that defaulting owners may bid at tax sales. It is for 
the legislature and not the courts to formulate such a policy. 
The petition for a peremptory writ of mandate is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
I do not agree with the conclusion reached in the majority 
opinion or the reasons upon which it is based. I am con-
vinced that the majority opinion entirely misconceives the 
purpose of the legislature in the enactment of sections 3834.20 
to 3834.25 of the Political Code, and overlooks the serious 
consequences which will flow from the rule laid down therein. 
Abstractly stated, the majority opinion purports to hold that 
a person holding the record title to real property which has 
been assessed and the taxes permitted to go delinquent and 
the property sold to the state for delinquent taxes, cannot 
purchase said property from the state at delinquent tax sale 
even though he is the highest bidder· at such sale. No legisla-:-
tive declaration is relied upon for this holding. On the con-
trary it is conceded that the statutes of this state create no 
prohibition whatever against a former owner becoming a 
purchaser of property at delinquent tax sale from the state 
under any circumstances. 
The principal reason for the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion is stated therein as follows: 
"If a defaulting owner were allowed in effect to redeem his 
property through the simple device of submitting the highest 
bid at the tax sale, he could evade the conditions of redemp-
tion set forth in section 3817 of the Political Code. . . . " 
That this reason is unsound and not a just or reasonable 
basis for discriminating against the owner of tax delinquent 
property in favor ofa stranger to the title thereto, is to my 
mind obvious. 
The majority opinion does not indicate the extent to which 
the prohibition against an owner of property to bid for the 
purchase of same at a tax sale may go; that is, whether such 
prohibition extends to all persons' interested in the property 
or. only to an owner in severalty who. held the title thereto in 
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fee simple and to whom the property was assessed at the 
time of the tax' delinquency. What the situation will be with 
reference to the owners of various interests in such property 
is not indicated. In other words, is a remainderman who is 
entitled to the fee after the termination of a life estate within 
the prohibited class? Is a conditional vendee under a con-
tract of sale likewise within the prohibited class Y Is a mort-
gagee or beneficiary under a trust deed covering the property 
in such prohibited class Y Are the heirs or legal representa-
tives of a deceased property owner in such prohibited class Y 
Are trustees to whom property has been conveyed in trust 
in such prohibited class? Is the owner of property which 
has been erroneously assessed to another person in such 
prohibited class 1 Are persons entitled to future or condi-
tional estates or interests in real property in such prohibited 
class T All of these and many other questions may arise to 
plague property owners and officials administering the tax 
laws as the result of the conclusion reached in the majority 
opinion. 
Section 3780 of the Political Code provides that property 
sold for delinquent taxes may be redeemed by the owner or 
any party in interest; and section 3817. of the same code pro-
vides that such property may be redeemed by the owner, 
his heirs, executors, administrators or other S1,tGcessors in 
interest. If the reason given by the majority opinion for 
prohibiting an owner from purchasing property at delinquent 
tax sale is sound, then all other parties enumerated in the 
last mentioned sections of the Political Code who are given 
the right to. redeem should likewise be prohibited from pur-
chasing such property at delinquent tax sale. 
But aside from the untoward consequences which will flow 
from the rule announced in the majority opinion, there are 
cogent and persuasive reasons why it was not the intention of 
the legislature by the enactment of sections 3834.20 to 3834.25 
of the Political Code to preclude or prohibit an owner or per-
son having an interest in real property from becoming a pur-
chaser at delinquent tax sale of such property if he qualifies 
as the highest bidder at such sale. 
I can perceive of no reason founded Upon equity or justice 
or any consideration of public policy as a basis for the con-
clusion that such owner or person interested should not be 
permitted to become a purchaser of such property. 
July, 1941.] GARVEY v. BYRAM. 
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It is a matter of common knowledge that at the time of 
the enactment of the legislation in question many thousands 
of parcels of real property in this state had been sold to the 
state for delinquent taxes and had not been redeemed, and, 
in my opinion, there is no basis for any other assumption than 
that the reason for such tax delinquency was due almost en-
tirely to the inability of property owners to pay their taxes 
because of the period of great financial stringency which has 
existed in this country since 1929. In other words, people 
lost their property on account of tax delinquency because they 
were financially unable to pay their taxes. This situation was 
recognized by the legislature of this state in the various tax 
moratorium statutes adopted between 1933 and 1939. It is 
also a matter of common know ledge that as a result of the 
great financial depression through which this country passed 
between 1929 and 1939, real estate values greatly decreased, 
and in my opinion it is a reasonable assumption that numerous 
parcels of land in this state were assessed for the purposes of 
taxation at the beginning of the depression at a value which 
would produce a tax for an amount in excess of the deflated 
value of that property during the period of the depression. 
For this reason owners who became financially able refrained 
from redeeming their property because to do so would require 
them to pay to the various taxing entities more than the fair 
market value of the property at the time of redemption; 
hence, the property remained unredeemed and it could not 
be sold under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of 
the Political Code sections authorizing the board of super-
visors with the approval of the tax collector and the state 
controller to :fix a minimum price at which such property 
could be sold less than the amount of delinquent taxes and 
penalties against it. Hence, in order to get the title to the 
property back into private ownership and restored to the 
assessment rolls, the legislature enacted the statutes here un-
der consideration. 
Conceding that it was the purpose and object of the legis-
lature in the enactment of these statutory provisions to rein-
state such tax delinquent property on the assessment rolls of 
the various taxing entities of the state, and that such provi-
sions were not intended primarily for the relief of owners who 
had lost their property because of their financial inability to 
redeem it, I can nevertheless see no reason why an owner or 
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person interested in such property should not be accorded the 
same right as a stranger to bid at the delinquent tax sale of 
such property and acquire the title thereto pursuant to the 
statutory provisions above mentioned. In fact, I can see 
many reasons why the owner should be permitted to bid for 
the purchase of such property. He is obviously more familiar 
with the property and should have a better idea of its value 
and would be disposed to place a higher bid for the property 
than a stranger. Obviously, the taxing entities would profit 
in such event. Furthermore, since the taxing entities would 
receive no more money from the sale of the property whether 
it is purchased by the owner or a stranger to the title,con-
siderations of public policy should favor the owner retaining 
the title to his property even though the sale to him is comrid-
ered nothing more than a method of redeeming the property 
from delinquent tax sale. Even if the legislature had pro-
vided that the owner would not be permitted to become a pur-
chaser of the property at delinquent tax sale, in my opinion 
there is grave doubt as to whether or not such provision 
would not be in violation of the equal protection clause of the 
14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
In other words, ~uch provision would discriminate against a 
former owner of real property who should have the same 
standing as any other member of the public as a ,purchaser 
of the property from the state at delinquent tax sale. 
The cases cited in the majority opinion commencing with 
the case of Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal. 38 [85 Am. Dec. 94] ; to 
Gates v. Lindley, 104 Cal. 451 [38 Pac. 311], are not in point, 
as in none of these cases was the owner's right to bid for the 
purchase of his property at delinquent tax sale questioned by 
the officials administering the sale, and the title which the 
owner acquired as the result of such purchase. was· not at-
tacked by the taxing entity. These cases simply hold that 
under well settled principles of equity jurisprudence a prop-
erty owner cannot cut off junior lien claims against his prop-
erty by permitting the taxes levied against it to become de-
linquent and then purchase the title from the taxing entity 
at delinquent tax sale to the detriment of such junior lien 
claimants. No question of this character is involved in the 
case at bar. The sole question involved here is whether or not 
when the legislature provided that the board of supervisors, 
with the approval' of the tax collector and state controller 
fixed the minimum amount at which tax delinquent property 
July, 1941.J GARVEY V. BYRAM. 
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could be sold by the state to the highest bidder, it thereby 
intended to preclude the owner of the property at the time of 
the delinquency from becoming a purchaser at such sale even 
though he was the highest bidder for such property. 
To my mind, it is improbable and contrary to human in-
stincts and inclination to say that to permit an owner to be-
come a purchaser at delinquent tax sale would tend to en-
courage tax delinquency because it would encourage owners 
to let their taxes go delinquent with the intention and design 
of purchasing the property at delinquent tax sale and evading 
the payment of a portion of the tax burden which had accrued 
against their property. In my opinion, no reasonably pru-
dent person would run the risk of losing his property as the 
result of such a procedure in order to avoid the. small saving 
which might result therefrom; .My experience as a member of 
the bar for more than twenty-five years and as attorney for 
counties, cities and other taxing entities in dealing with 'prob-
lems of this character convinces me that there is no basis for an 
argument of this character and it affords no sound reason for 
the conclusion' reached in the majority opinion. 
It seems much more reasonable and logical tome to conclude 
that in fixing the minimum amount at which property sold to 
the state for delinquent taxes could be purchased, the tax col-
lector and board of supervisors would take into consideration 
the fair market value of the property and fix such amount as 
in their judgment a prospective purchaser would be justified 
in paying therefor in view of the changed· conditions as to 
market value since its sale to the state, and since the former 
owner has nothing to say about the amount so fixed, and the 
taxing entities are benefited because his bid is higher than all 
others, it is impossible for me to see how it can be claimed that 
the taxing entities are in any way injured or that it is not in 
the public interest to permit the owner to become a purchaser 
at such sale. 
n can be appropriately stated that the situation here pre-
sented is "a condition not a theory," and that its solution 
requires the application of nothing more than a little common 
sense. If the legislature had intended to prohibit the owner 
from bidding, it would have said so, and this court has no 
authority to write anything into a statute which the legislature 
has omitted therefrom. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1858.) Is it 
not much more reasonable to assume that the legislature in-
288 GARVEY v. BYRAM. [18 C. (2d) 
tended, by its failure to prohibit the owner from bidding, to 
thereby afford him an opportunity to regain title to his prop-
erty without being required to pay more than it is worth in 
order to redeem it? I am forced so to conclude. 
Respondent contends that to permit an owner to purchase 
his property at delinquent tax sale for less than the full 
amount required to redeem the property would constitute a 
gift of public money, and an interpretation of section 3834.25 
which would permit such owner to purchase his property at 
delinquent tax sale would render said section unconstitutional 
as being in violation of article IV, section 31 of the Constitu-
tion of California. Section 31 of article IV restricts the 
legislature from making any gift or authorizing the making 
of any gift of any public money or thing of yalue to any in-
dividual, etc., but the above mentioned section of the Political 
Code does not make or authorize the making of a gift to the 
owner of real property which has been sold to the state for 
delinquent taxes by permitting him to become a purchaser at 
the delinquent tax sale of said property. In the case at bar 
the state has by foreclosure acquired title to Garvey's land. 
The Political Code sections in question authorize the sale of 
this land at a price not less than that fixed by the tax col-
lector, approved by the board of supervisors and the state 
controller. Any member of the public has the right to bid 
for the purchase of this land at the delinquent tax sale thereof. 
Garvey placed the highest bid ~or the land, which means that 
the taxing entity received more for the land than if he had 
not bid. Obviously, any member of the public had the right 
to purchase this property if he placed a higher bid than that 
submitted by Garvey. In either case the tax lien is extin-
guished by the sale of the property. It is presumed that the 
highest bidder paid all that the property Was worth at the 
time of the sale. Therefore, the state was not giving Garvey 
anything by permitting him to bid more for the property than 
any other member of the public was disposed to bid for it. 
Under such circumstances it cannot be said by any stretch of 
the imagination that the state gave Garvey anything or that 
the state lost anything by permitting him to bid more for 
the property than anyone else was disposed to bid. 
Respondent also contends that a sale to a record owner for 
less than the amount of delinquent taxes would constitute 
nonuniform taxation in contravention of article XIII, section 
July, 1941.J GARVEY V. BYRAM. 
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1 of the California Constitution. The first 'sentence of said 
section reads as follows: 
" All property in the State except as otherwise in this Con-
stitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascer-
tained as provided by law, or as 'hereinafter provided." 
While this section provides for uniformity of taxation and not 
for uniformity in collection of taxes, it must be conceded that 
if a statutory system of tax'ation were devised whereby all 
property would be uniformly taxed in the first instance and 
thereafter certain classes of property were favored in the 
matter of tax collection resulting in substantial variation in 
the amount collected, such system of taxation would violate 
the above quoted constitutional provision. That, however, 
is not the situation here. The property of no particular per-
son or no particUlar class is singled out for different treat-
ment, but all are subjected to precisely the same statutory 
method of taxation and collection. That one person is en-
abled.in a particular instance to discharge his tax lien for less 
than his neighbor does not change the situation~ The primary 
obligation of real property tax'ation in this state is not upon, 
the person but upon the property. Since 1933 there has been 
no enforceable personal obligation for taxes against the owner 
of real property. In that year section 3899 of the Political 
Code was repealed and in the same year section 3771 was 
amended so as to provide as follows: 
"Provided, further, that no suit shall be brought against 
the owner or person in possession of said property to recover 
any taxes, assessments, penalties or costs if said property is 
real property." 
Thus, in applying the constitutional provisions above men-
tioned, we should disregard the person to whom the property 
is assessed and consider only the property taxed. Considered 
in that light, there is no difference between permitting the 
record owner or possessor to purchase the property at tax 
sale for less than' the amount of the tax lien and permitting 
an entire stranger to do the same thing. In either event the 
property bears the same tax burden. In either event the 
taxation of property is equally either uniform or nonuniform. 
Since it must be conceded that a stranger may purchase at 
delinquent tax sale for less than the amount of extended 
18 c. (2d)-lG 
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taxes, there can be no violation of article XIII, section 1 of 
the Constitution in permitting a record owner to do likewise. 
For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that a per~ 
emptory writ of mandate should -issue requiring respondent 
to execute and deliver to petitioner Garvey a deed conveying 
the title of the property in question to him. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied August 
21, 1941. Houser, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[L. A. Nos. 16969, 16970. In Bank.-July 24, 1941.] 
A. P. JENSEN et al., Respondents, v. HUGH EVANS & 
COMP ANY (a Corporation) et al., Defendants; L. H. 
BOOKER et al., Third Party Claimants and Appellants. 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
(Two Cases.) 
New Trial-Proceedings in Which Authorized-Third Party 
Claim Proceedings.-In a third party claim proceeding under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 689, a new trial is not authorized, and a mo-
tion therefor is properly stricken. 
Trusts-Massachusetts. Trusts-Bond of Trustee-Ownership 
of Proceeds.-The proceeds of a judgment recovered in an ac-
tion against a surety company for misapplication by original 
trustees of a Massachusetts trust of the trust funds belong to 
the shareholders where the obligation of the bond ran, not to 
the trust estate, but directly to the subscribers of shares in the 
trust. This is true where in an action brought by certain 
shareholders as representatives of the class of subscribers the 
plaintiffs are afterwards appointed trustees of the trust and 
undertake the prosecution in such capacity as well, and where 
the purpose of such amendment is merely to protect the surety 
company against future claims on behalf of the trust estate. 
ld.-Massachusetts Trusts-Bond of Trustee-Ownership of 
Proceeds-Right of Judgment Creditors of Trusts.-Judgment 
creditors of an insolvent Massachusetts trust who recover a 
money judgment in lieu of a return of property in an action 
for rescission of a contract for sUbscription of shares on the 
ground of deceit and violation of the Corporate Securities Act, 
are not entitled to the benefit of bonds of the trustees condi-
tioned on honest application of funds of the trust estate de-
McK. Dig. References: 1. New Trial, § 7; 2-4. Trusts, § 6; 5. 
Banks, § 89; 6. Levy and Seizure, § 5. 
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rived from the sale of shares, as against individual share-
holders for whose protection the bond was given. 
[4a,4b] ld.-Massachusetts Trusts-Bond of Trustee-Ownership 
of Proceeds-Test of Ownership.-The ultimate ownership of 
funds recovered in an action by shareholder-trustees suing on 
a. bond of original trustees in a Massachusetts trust is not de-
termined by the fact that in the pleadings and other documents 
in the action no distinction between the two capacities of the 
plaintiffs is noticed. 
[5] Banks-Deposits-Trusts in Deposits.-The question of owner-
ship of funds on deposit in a bank is not determined by the 
title to the account. That is significant only as it may give 
rise to a disputable presumption where the facts remain un-
disclosed. 
[6] Levy and Seizure-Debtor's Title.-A judgment creditor can 
acquire no greater right in the property levied on than the judg-
ment debtor possesses at the time of the levy. If at that time 
the debtor possesses no right whatsoever in the property, the 
ereditor acquires none. . 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
.Angeles County, from an order striking motions for new trial, 
and from an order requiring the posting of a bond. Myron 
Westover, Judge. Judgments reversed; appeals from orders dismissed. 
Third party claim proceedings involving a cont~st between 
shareholder-trustees of two Massachusetts trusts and judg-
ment creditors of the trusts in respect of two bank deposits 
which consist of funds recovered in an action on the bond of 
original trustees. Judgments for judgment creditors re-
versed. Appeals from certain orders dismissed. 
Olson & Olson,.A1len Miller, Robert Clifton and Olson & 
.A.hlport for Appellants. 
Max Lewis, A. Arnold Klein, LaurenceM. Weinberg and 
Loeb & Loeb for Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-These actions have been consolidated for hear-
ing on appeal. In each there are two appeals by separate 
groups of third party claimants from a single judgment de-
5. See 4 Oal Jur.202. 
